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the Department of Defense (DoD) and spiral development (SD) is the preferred process 
to execute this tactic.  SD is used when the end-state of a weapon system is unknown, and 
its purpose is to get valuable capability into warfighters’ hands much more quickly than 
before, even if the deliverable is only a partial solution.  This approach is markedly 
different than the traditional DoD acquisition approach that too often fielded weapon 
systems late, over budget and with obsolete technology.  As with any DoD initiative, SD 
is not a panacea.  The purpose of this MBA Project is to identify some of the key 
characteristics necessary to implement SD in government acquisitions, and to present 
lessons learned from a program office currently using a spiral development approach.  
This is accomplished through a case study of the Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) Program.  This paper examines the Global Hawk’s spiral development strategies 
in several key program functional areas.  It discusses SD challenges, and benefits with 
particular attention given to successful tactics and potential pitfalls of using this 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) has been named the acquisition strategy of choice 
for the Department of Defense (DoD) and spiral development (SD) is the preferred 
process to execute this strategy.1  There have been a small number of programs that have 
been under spiral development for any length of time, since SD was only conceived in the 
1980s2, and the DoD has only embraced the process over the past five years.  One of 
these pathfinder programs is the Global Hawk UAV program, which is managed by the 
Global Hawk Systems Group (GHSG), within the Reconnaissance Systems Wing, located 
at the Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.  The Global 
Hawk program is known as a trailblazer in the area of spiral development, and can offer 
priceless insight into some of their lessons learned. 
Implementing an appropriate spiral development strategy is easier said than done.  
In fact, there have been many challenges in implementation.  As more programs evaluate 
the feasibility of spiral development, they will need a practitioner’s view to help them 
institute the new process.  This project should assist the practitioner in this endeavor.  It 
will also give background on key programmatic areas that Integrated Product Team (IPT) 
members must focus on to help achieve spiral development success. 
Most program offices have specialized managers in each of their areas of 
expertise, therefore we have tailored research questions to benefit each practitioner.  This 
paper should benefit personnel in the technical, financial management, and logistics 




1 US Department of Defense. (2003, May) “The Defense Acquisition System.” DoD Directive 5000.1. 
p. 2. 
2 Blanchard B. S. & Fabrycky, W. J. (1998) Systems Engineering and Analysis (3rd ed.). Prentice-Hall. 
P.28   
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1.2  PURPOSE 
The purpose of this MBA project is to identify some of the key characteristics 
necessary to implement spiral development in government acquisitions, and to present 
lessons learned from a program office currently using a spiral development approach.  
This is accomplished through a case study of the Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) Program.  This paper examines the Global Hawk’s spiral development strategies, 
challenges, and benefits with particular attention given to successful tactics and potential 
pitfalls of using this acquisition approach.     
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The focus of the research for this report centers on two areas.  First, it examines 
actual Global Hawk Systems Group issues through the first question:   
What are the technical, program management, financial, and logistical benefits 
and challenges experienced by Global Hawk as a result of implementing a 
spiral development approach? 
The report will also convey overarching lessons learned that can be applied 
broadly to most programs implementing a SD approach through the second question:   
What are some of the lessons learned from the Global Hawk program’s spiral 
development approach that could be useful to other program managers 
directing a spiral development program? 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology for this project consists of three major components.  
The first component is a literature review on spiral development, evolutionary 
acquisition, and agile acquisition published in scholarly journals, trade journals, and DoD 
doctrine.  The second piece includes interviews with key IPT members from the GHSG, 
performing the following functions:  program management, financial management, 
systems engineering, requirements planning, and logistics.  Those interviewed will not be 
identified by name, but by function.  The third component is an analysis of the 
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information obtained from research and interviews to identify some of the key 
characteristics necessary to implement spiral development in government acquisitions.   
1.5 ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I is a broad overview of this report and lays out the general roadmap of 
the research through a purpose, research questions, organization and methodology. 
Chapter II provides an overview of spiral development policy and programmatic 
implications through a literature review.  This literature review explores recent articles 
from scholarly journals and trade journals and focuses on four areas impacted by spiral 
development:  technology development and fielding, program management, financial 
management, and logistics. 
Chapter III presents the methodology behind the interviews with GHSG team 
members.  This is followed by an introduction to the Global Hawk and provides a short 
history of the weapon system, its mission and technical capabilities.  Next it provides 
details on Global Hawk’s operational experience and typical flight operations.  It 
concludes with a look at Global Hawk’s programmed spirals and projected strategy. 
Chapter IV answers the research questions proposed in Chapter I by providing a 
description and analysis of the major spiral development benefits and challenges in the 
technology development and fielding, program management, financial management, and 
logistics areas within the Global Hawk program.  The chapter concludes with a 
description of lessons learned from this trailblazing office that can be applied to future 
spiral development endeavors. 
Chapter V summarizes the findings of the research and presents recommendations 
for further research and study. 
1.6 BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The primary benefit of this study is the identification of program management 
lessons learned from the Global Hawk spiral development process.  This study gives 
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future program managers insight into Global Hawk’s spiral development strategy and its 
effects.  Finally, those program managers can profit from the experiences of current 
program personnel and use those lessons to help enable success in fielding complex 
systems in today’s dynamic military acquisition environment.     
1.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter began the research on spiral development and the key characteristics 
necessary to implement SD in any DoD acquisition program.  It discussed the 
background and purpose behind the research.  In addition, it introduced the research 
questions and methodology undertaken.  Finally, it provided the framework for the report 
format, and listed the benefits of this study.  The literature review in the next chapter 
dives into SD and the focus areas of this study.       
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter introduces the concepts of spiral development, evolutionary 
acquisition, and agile acquisition.  Its purpose is to explore a sample of recent literature 
on the subject and to dissect some of the conjecture on this relatively new approach to 
acquisition. 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Military acquisitions are constantly under scrutiny for cost overruns, sliding 
schedules, and user disillusionment at the hands of useless products.  According to 
Johnson and Johnson, every few years “the acquisition process for defense in the United 
States is considered broken… [and] seems ripe for repair.”3  Holding true to recent 
transformation initiatives, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, 
Marvin Sambur, aptly named the USAF’s initiative Agile Acquisition.  In a recent 
interview, Sambur stated that the goal of agile acquisition is “building credibility within 
and outside the acquisition community and reducing cycle time by a ratio of 4:1.”4  Agile 
acquisition has only recently been used in the Air Force, and is referred to more 
commonly as evolutionary acquisition (EA). 
To start this literature review, the reader must first have a working knowledge of 
the topic at issue: EA.  EA is defined by Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 
5000.2 as a procurement strategy that puts new technology into the hands of the 
warfighter, or users, quickly.  The instruction further calls for continuous requirements 
definition to ensure the acquisition community stays abreast of user needs.5  The result of 
EA should be getting today’s technology into the hands of the users as soon as possible.  
 
3Johnson, W. M., & Johnson, C. O. (2002) “The Promise and Perils of Spiral Acquisition: A Practical 
Approach to Evolutionary Acquisition.” Acquisition Review Quarterly..  p. 175. 
4 “Interview with Marvin Sambur, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition).” Program 
Manager. July/August 2003. p. 34. 
5 US Department of Defense. (2003 May) “The Defense Acquisition System.” DoD Directive 5000.1.  
p. 3. 
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Since the focus of this MBA project is on a specific Air Force program, it is necessary to 
examine the Air Force’s preferred acquisition strategy.   
The Air Force narrows the scope of EA in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 63-123, 
calling it a strategy to field a system quickly, with an intention to “develop and field 
additional capabilities [through] successive increments.”6   Farkas and Thurston 
synthesized the definitions as “a strategy that develops and delivers . . . an initial 
capability and continues the development and production of the system to provide 
additional capability over time.”7   
EA is a strategy.  Spiral development (SD) is one approach.  DoD 5000.2 defines 
SD as a process in which users have identified their desired capability, but do not 
understand exactly what the end state requirements will be.8  In this process, the 
acquisition community will rapidly field a system based on current technology balanced 
with user requirements.  The process calls for future development spirals in which 
feedback from the users, lessons learned from the field, and maturing technology are 
incorporated into the design.   
The Air Force again refined the scope of SD’s definition in AFI 63-123, calling it 
an “iterative set of sub-processes that may include: establish performance objectives; 
design; code, fabricate, and integrate; experiment; test; assess operational utility; make 
trade offs; and deliver [the system].”9  The instruction further discusses typical 
characteristics of a SD process.  The process normally calls for a team seeking to mitigate 
risk through firm development, production, test, and fielding plans.  Farkas and Thurston 
give a practitioner’s definition of SD as an “iterative process that includes collaboration 
with the stakeholders/users and continuous feedback . . . to provide the best possible 
 
6 US Department of the Air Force. (2000) “Evolutionary Acquisition for C2 Systems.” Air Force 
Instruction 63-123.  para 3.1. 
7 Farkas K. & Thurston, P. (2003, Jul/Aug) “Evolutionary Acquisition Strategies and Spiral 
Development Processes: Developing Affordable, Sustainable Capability to the Warfighters.”  Program 
Manager. p. 11. 
8 US Department of Defense. (2003, May 12) “The Defense Acquisition System.” DoD Directive 
5000.1. p. 4. 
9 US Department of the Air Force. (2000) “Evolutionary Acquisition for C2 Systems.” Air Force 
Instruction 63-123.  para 4.1. 
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capability for a specific increment.”10  Thus, EA is the established acquisition strategy, 
and SD is the DoD’s go-to process to rapidly field new technology.   
SD differs from the traditional incremental development strategy, in which the 
program office plans to acquire the “entire end-state capability, as well as firm definitions 
of interim increments” in the first block.11  If the user desires changes after receiving the 
system, traditionally, the program office plans for them through preplanned product 
improvements (P3I). 
Spiral development became the cornerstone to the USAF acquisition community 
in June of 2002, when Dr. Sambur issued a new policy memorandum.  In the letter, he 
stressed the importance of rapidly fielding systems.  To do this, the Air Force’s preferred 
method, according to Sambur, should now be SD.12
The policy letter sent ripples across the acquisition community.  Since this new 
memorandum, there have been numerous articles written on programmatic successes and 
hazards of the SD process.  This is evident in just a short list of literature:  “Promise and 
Perils of SD”; “Conflict and Ambiguity Implementing EA”; and “Spiraling Cost.”    
This literature review analyzes the most recent text on EA and SD with the 
intention of extracting key elements crucial to successful implementation.  The review 
looks at a collection of articles and text on the subject through the following themes: 
technology development and fielding; program management; financial management; and 
logistics. 
 
2.1.1 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND FIELDING 
A program’s successful technology development hinges on several important 
factors, but begins with a sound systems engineering approach.  Blanchard and Fabrycky, 
 
10 Farkas K. & Thurston, P. (2003, Jul/Aug) “Evolutionary Acquisition Strategies and Spiral 
Development Processes: Developing Affordable, Sustainable Capability to the Warfighters.”  Program 
Manager. p. 13. 
11 US Department of Defense. (2004, Oct) “Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Version 1.0.” para 3.1.4. 
12 Sambur, Marvin, (2002, July) Reality-Based Acquisition System Policy for all Programs 
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in Systems Engineering and Analysis, note that systems engineering is unlike mechanical 
or civil engineering.  It is a well planned, highly disciplined approach, mixing the right 
technology and management techniques in a synergistic manner.13  Due to the broad 
scope of systems engineering, it is not feasible to address every aspect crucial to SD.  
However, three concepts that work hand in glove with systems engineering were 
prevalent in recent SD literature.  They are technology maturity, requirements 
employment strategy, and configuration management. 
2.1.1.1 TECHNOLOGY MATURITY 
Technology maturity at the early stages of a program is critical to fielding a 
system on time.  Expeditious fielding is one of the main tenets of EA and SD.  Compared 
to traditional programs, SD programs only have a fraction of the time normally dedicated 
to technology development.  Even minor development setbacks in a SD program can 
have a catastrophic impact on an already compressed schedule.   
A 2005 General Accountability Office (GAO) report studying technology 
maturity of major weapon systems stated that immature technology is the leading cause 
of weapon system cost overruns and late deliveries.  Program offices must ensure 
adequate maturity prior to integration to reduce program risk.   The report continued, 
stating: “successful programs make a science and technology organization, rather than the 
program or product development manager, responsible for maturing technologies.”14   
With this type of third party evaluation of technology status, a program office is not 
susceptible to unrealistically propitious schedules and cost estimates based on overly 
optimistic contractors and program managers.   
There are many methods of measuring technology maturity for transition 
readiness. Mahafza, Componation, and Tippett address several of these methods, 
although not specifically for a SD program.  Their report details a new method of 
 
13 Blanchard B. S. & Fabrycky, W. J. (1998) Systems Engineering and Analysis (3rd ed.). Prentice-
Hall.  p. 18. 
14 General Accountability Office. (2005, Mar) “Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Major 
Weapon Systems: GAO-05-301.  p. 6. 
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analyzing readiness.  This new methodology, the Technology Performance Risk Index 
(TPRI), combines two previous methods, Technical Performance Measure (TPM) and 
Degree of Difficulty (DD), to calculate a numerical risk value.  The authors contend that 
using TPRI “reduces the probability associated with immature technology being 
transitioned to a weapon system prematurely.”15  Again, although this TPRI was not 
introduced solely for SD programs, it could be fruitful in using a SD approach as 
programs look for the right time to fold in new technologies. 
2.1.1.2 REQUIREMENTS EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY 
A program’s requirements employment strategy ties in well with disciplined 
systems engineering.  The employment strategy balances current technology with 
warfighter’s needs.  The program office does not necessarily field capabilities in the same 
order as the users originally prioritized.  There may be a good reason to jockey the list to 
reduce cost.   
Johnson and Johnson discuss the importance of the requirements employment 
concept, stating that users must “trust the program office to combine capabilities where 
efficiencies occur, sometimes taking the requirements a little out of order.”16  They 
continued with the example of: 
An engine upgrade (Priority 4) with an alternate fuel certification (Priority 
6) in Spiral 1 and Spiral 2 containing the navigation avionics upgrades 
(Priority 5)…. The program office would explain that by doing both the 
engine and the fuel upgrade in the same spiral, the program could save 
resources in the wind tunnel tests.17
In this scenario, the savings in combined testing of the articles outweighed the 
benefits of fielding the navigations upgrade in the first spiral even though it had a higher 
 
15 Mahafza S., Componation, P, & Tippett, D. (2005, Spring) “A Performance-Based Technology 
Assessment Methodology to Support DoD Acquisition.” Defense Acquisition Review Journal. p. 281. 
16 Johnson, W. M., & Johnson, C. O. (2002) “The Promise and Perils of Spiral Acquisition: A 
Practical Approach to Evolutionary Acquisition.” Acquisition Review Quarterly.  p. 183. 
17 Ibid. p. 183. 
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priority than the fuel certification.  In any case, user trust (discussed in the program 
management section of this literature review) is critical to the employment strategy.   
 
2.1.1.3 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 
A typical concern of a program’s systems engineering approach is configuration 
management.  With several spirals in a SD program, there is a good chance for multiple 
configurations.  Johnson and Johnson address the advantages of SD over the traditional 
acquisition program in regards to this issue.  “With . . . block approaches and P3I efforts, 
multiple configurations currently exist on many fielded programs . . . With a spiral 
approach, the program expects, plans, and condones different configurations, allowing 
capability to be fielded more quickly.”18  
The 2004 Defense Acquisition Guidebook addresses the importance of 
configuration management, stating EA “has increased the importance of traceability in 
program management . . . Due to the nature of [EA], design, development, deployment 
and sustainment can each be occurring simultaneously for different system increments.”19  
Program offices must enforce, through constant communication and clarification, the 
configuration management plan.  This MBA project will explore the challenging task of 
configuration management in a system that simultaneously has a spiral fielded, one in 
production, and one in development. 
 The three technological areas discussed above are not independent; they are 
synergistic.  If a program office does one well, success is magnified in the other areas.  
The acquisitions community must strive to balance the maturity, strategy and 




18 Johnson, W. M., & Johnson, C. O. (2002) “The Promise and Perils of Spiral Acquisition: A 
Practical Approach to Evolutionary Acquisition.” Acquisition Review Quarterly.  p. 183.  
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2.1.2 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
Managing the cost, schedule and performance of a DoD weapon system is an 
arduous task.  With fewer people, less funding, and more time constraints than ever 
before, a program manager (PM) faces many daunting challenges.  These challenges can 
be exacerbated in a SD program, as the program is constantly evolving via spirals.  This 
means more cost, schedule and performance changes that must be managed.  PMs and 
their IPT members, especially the end-user (or warfighter) will benefit from an 
understanding of these problems and their potential resolution.  The literature reviewed 
discussed several strategies to reduce the risk associated with program management in a 
dynamic SD environment.  Two critical themes consistently appeared in this area:  IPT 
communication and user trust.   
2.1.2.1 IPT COMMUNICATION 
Within the military, the most prevalent enabler of communication success is the 
IPT.  An IPT normally consists of, but is not limited to the PM, government engineers, 
test and evaluation planners, financial managers, contracting officers, logisticians, the 
contractor, and a user representative. Boehm discusses the importance of including all 
stakeholders in a spiral development program.  They warn against omitting key members 
of an IPT, stating “excluding [IPT members] from the development cycles can lead to 
win-lose situations, which generally devolve into lose-lose situations.” 20  One way to 
combat communications decay is with regularly scheduled IPT meetings with consistent 
and empowered team members.   
The 2004 U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan mandates using a 
“collaborative requirements process [demanding] that the war fighter, acquirer, and tester 
work as one team… throughout the development of a weapon system.”21  The users must 
 
19 US Department of Defense (2004, Oct) “Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Version 1.0.” para 4.1.4. 
20 Boehm, B, & Hansen, W. J.  (2001, Jan) “Understanding the Spiral Model as a Tool for 
Evolutionary Acquisition.” University of Southern California Special Report.  p. 6. 
21 US Department of the Air Force. (2004) The US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan.  p. 23. 
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work with the acquirer to prioritize the list of capabilities that they need fielded, while the 
testers must develop a realistic plan to seamlessly verify system readiness.  
Rippere suggested an IPT structure consisting of the “requirers”, the 
technologists, the testers, the acquirers, and industry.  He stressed the importance of 
industry involvement, stating that contractors “must be included in the initial concept 
development, traditionally a government-only activity” for SD to work.22  Direct 
industry-user communications give realistic expectations for initial and follow-on spirals.    
Regardless of the motivation for involvement, it appears the more up front 
involvement by all stakeholders, the better.  This sounds great in theory, but managing all 
of these players can be an onerous task.  Nevertheless, the program manager should find 
that open, early, and consistent communication will help warfighters receive today’s 
technology today.  
2.1.2.2 USER TRUST 
User trust is critical in any acquisition process.  The SD process calls for a much 
higher degree of user trust of the acquisition community than other acquisition processes.  
Over the years, the old requirements generation process created an engrained negative 
perception among users.  As a general rule, if the user did not demand every capability in 
the first delivery, they would never see the envisioned end item.  Users were under the 
distinct impression that anything conceded in the first weapon system block would be 
considered superfluous and never delivered at a later date.  Thus, the user’s strategy has 
always been to demand a 100-percent solution from the start.   
This mentality changes in SD, starting with the Initial Capabilities Document 
(ICD).  Major General Robert A. Nadeau, Commanding General Research Development 
and Engineering Command, stated “despite its shortfalls [a UAV] flying new is better 
than nothing.”23  He went on to state that users must concede to an 80, 60, or even a 40 
 
22 Rippere, R. B. (2004) “Acquisition transformation: Lead into gold?” Defense & AT-L.  p. 38. 
23 Nadeau, R. A., Maj Gen, (2005, May 17-18) 2nd Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, 
Monterey, CA, Comment on Spiral Development with regard to Raven hand-launched UAV.  
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percent solution, understanding that not every requirement will be met in the first spiral.   
The using command must have full confidence that their acquisition team will not let 
them down in the future.   
Novak, Sthultz, Reed, and Wood agree. The first of ten recommendations for 
executing EA is that “the user must accept the fielding of a 60% to 80% solution”.24  
However, while users may understand this concept, there is always a semblance of doubt, 
especially when considering the volatility of congressional military funding. 
2.1.3 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
All programs, whether developed using SD or via incremental acquisition, are 
subject to strict financial regulations.  The DoD’s use of multiple “colors” of money for 
different appropriations (Research Development Test and Evaluation [RDT&E], 
procurement, operations and maintenance [O&M], etc.) often puts DoD financial 
managers into inflexible positions due to the difficulty of moving money between 
appropriations.  In fact, if a program uses the wrong type of funds for a contract action or 
if a program gets into a contract without enough funding to cover the terms of the 
contract, that program violates federal law.  Additionally, the DoD’s highly complex 
Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) does not allow for 
short term flexibility with funding.  It forces a program to look over the horizon at future 
funding requirements, and where to fold them into the budget.   
Certainly, both the strict financial regulations and PPBES serve important roles to 
eliminate illegal financial transactions and increase the chances of financial 
accountability.  However, as they exist today, they make the financial manager’s job 
more difficult in a spiral development environment.  This section reviews literature that 
discussed financial management challenges and opportunities under a SD setting via two 
lenses:  budgeting and execution.   
 
24 Novak R.M., Sthultz T. T., Reed T. S., and Wood C. C. (2004) “Evolutionary Acquisition: An 
Analysis of Defense Procurement and Recommendations for Expanded Use.”  Journal of Public 
Procurement.  Vol. 4 (2). p. 256. 
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2.1.3.1 BUDGETING 
The literature reviewed highlighted three prominent budgeting challenges as a 
result of taking a SD approach:  unstable future funding; mismatching with the Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle; and Life Cycle Cost (LCC) challenges.  
First, due to the iterative nature of SD and its required flexibility to move 
requirements in and out of spirals, out-year funding becomes unstable.  This, of course, is 
at odds with the current financial construct, which requires stability.  Novak, et al. agree, 
“funding and requirements stability are critical to the effective execution of EA as they 
are in any acquisition.”25  This is not an easy task.  The following pieces of literature 
provide a few recommendations for this issue. 
Johnson and Johnson state, “the financial community and leadership must accept 
that content in later spirals is subject to change based on technology and user needs.  
They must accept placeholders in some cases and budget for that.”26  This is a 
fundamental shift in the way budgeting is done.  It could potentially require policy 
change and certainly a cultural change within the DoD.  On that point, Hansen, Foreman, 
Albert, Axelband, Brownsword, and Forrester agree, “the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) and the services should promote an understanding of the unique funding 
needs of the EA/SD programs by the financial management community (to avoid cuts of 
funds essential to the implementation of flexible requirements and milestones).”27  These 
suggestions illustrate the importance of open communications between all stakeholders in 
a new DoD landscape driven by SD’s nuances. 
Partially as a result of unstable requirements and funding, the mismatch between 
spiral development and the POM cycle is a challenge.  Slate stressed, “The biggest 
 
25 Novak R.M., Sthultz T. T., Reed T. S., and Wood C. C. (2004) “Evolutionary Acquisition: An 
Analysis of Defense Procurement and Recommendations for Expanded Use.”  Journal of Public 
Procurement.  Vol. 4 (2).  p. 261. 
26 Johnson, W. M., & Johnson, C. O. (2002, Summer) “The Promise and Perils of Spiral Acquisition: 
A Practical Approach to Evolutionary Acquisition.” Acquisition Review Quarterly.  p. 186. 
27 Hansen, W.J., Foreman, J.T., Albert, C.C., Axelband, E., Brownsword, L.L. & Forrester, E.C. 
(2001, Aug) “Spiral Development and Evolutionary Acquisition:  The SEI-CSE Workshop, September 
2000.”  Special Report CMU/SEI-2001-SR-005.  p. 40. 
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problem is the time necessary to get the money for these programs into the POM 
cycle.”28   He opines that because of this challenge, financial mangers must be given the 
liberty to change the funding amounts down the road without penalty.  Hansen, et al. 
share the concern that “EA/SD are not synchronized with the budget process . . . [and] 
current contractual procedures are not sufficiently flexible.”29  To help alleviate this 
concern, they propose three measures:  1) Congress should improve the current funding 
model for all DoD projects; 2) OSD should create measures to synchronize funding with 
program milestones; and 3) Services should budget for certain areas such as Command 
and Control in the aggregate versus individually.30  These measures would be nothing 
short of a dramatic paradigm shift in the DoD financial arena, and probably would not 
happen unless the entire DoD embraced this movement in resounding force. 
Finally, performing LCC analyses is more difficult with SD.  Since each spiral 
contains a different baseline configuration, it is easy to focus on the current baseline 
being developed instead of the aggregate program costs or total ownership cost (TOC) of 
the system.  Indeed, Novak et al. state, “EA essentially requires a more complex life 
cycle cost analysis since the number of variables increases with unstable and dynamic 
requirements.”31  In studying TOC reduction, Boudreau and Naegle discuss many ways 
to reduce TOC such as using tools like tradeoff analysis, reliability-centered 
maintenance, performance-based logistics and activity-based costing.32   Clearly, 
financial managers in spiral development programs need to remain focused on TOC 




28 Slate, A.R. (2002, May/Jun) “Evolutionary Acquisition:  Breaking the Mold—New Possibilities 
from a Changed Perspective.”  Program Manager.  p. 15. 
29 Hansen, W.J., Foreman, J.T., Albert, C.C., Axelband, E., Brownsword, L.L. & Forrester, E.C. 
(2001, Aug) “Spiral Development and Evolutionary Acquisition:  The SEI-CSE Workshop, September 
2000.”  Special Report CMU/SEI-2001-SR-005.  p. 39. 
30 Ibid. p. 52. 
31 Novak R.M., Sthultz T. T., Reed T. S., and Wood C. C. (2004) “Evolutionary Acquisition: An 
Analysis of Defense Procurement and Recommendations for Expanded Use.”  Journal of Public 
Procurement.  Vol. 4 (2). 2004.  p. 257. 
32 Boudreau, M. W., Naegle, B. R., (2003) “Reduction of total ownership cost.” NPS-AM-03-004.    
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executable.  After all, cost overruns were a chief complaint of the traditional acquisition 
system, and a main reason for the DoD’s shift towards acquisition reform, which led to 
EA and SD. 
2.1.3.2 EXECUTION 
In addition to the budgeting challenges arising from SD, funding execution is also 
challenging under the SD paradigm.   Current SD literature consistently showed two 
challenging SD execution areas in particular:  susceptibility to funding cuts and 
management difficulties with increased simultaneous use of multiple colors of money. 
First, a program using SD is perhaps more susceptible to funding cuts than a 
traditional program.  In one article regarding the challenges of SD, the authors point out, 
“Spiral acquisition is inherently flexible and could lead to budget cutbacks in difficult 
times because the program can weather the impacts without catastrophic failure . . . [they 
are] viewed as a “cash cow” for less flexible acquisitions.”33  In other words, it can be 
difficult to execute funds if DoD leadership assumes a SD program can “take a hit” this 
year since they can adjust their schedule to fold in capabilities in a future spiral.  This is 
akin to robbing Peter (an SD program) to pay Paul (a non-SD program) without any 
future payback.  
Next, financial management may become more difficult due to the increase in 
concurrent use of funding appropriations.  One working group at Carnegie Mellon 
University’s Software Engineering Institute anticipates, “In the year 2010, evolutionary 
acquisition enhanced by spiral development will have a greater degree of concurrent 
research and development, production, and operation for a given program than occurs 
today.”34  This makes sense given that at any point in a program’s lifetime, Spiral 1 could 
be operating in the field (spending O&M funding), with Spiral 2 undergoing final 
 
33 Johnson, W. M., & Johnson, C. O. (2002, Summer) “The Promise and Perils of Spiral Acquisition: 
A Practical Approach to Evolutionary Acquisition.” Acquisition Review Quarterly.  p. 186. 
34 Hansen, W.J., Foreman, J.T., Albert, C.C., Axelband, E., Brownsword, L.L. & Forrester, E.C.  
(2001, Aug) “Spiral Development and Evolutionary Acquisition:  The SEI-CSE Workshop, September 
2000.”  Special Report CMU/SEI-2001-SR-005.  p. 36. 
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operational testing (spending procurement funding) while Spiral 3 technologies are under 
development (spending RDT&E funding).  This concurrency in spending occurs with 
traditional acquisition during upgrades, for example.  But, it would seem that SD would 
increase the instances of concurrency.  Because of this, Novak et al. recommend new 
training and flexibility for financial managers in an EA setting.35
From both a budgeting and execution perspective, the literature reviewed pointed 
out several important considerations when using a SD approach.  Whether dealing with 
an unstable funding problem within a budgeting framework or trying to manage multiple 
colors of money at once, a financial manager must be aware of SD’s budgetary and 
execution pitfalls and have proper training to handle this new era of agile acquisition. 
2.1.4 LOGISTICS 
DoD logistics personnel could become more non-supportive of spiral 
development than any other member of a program’s IPT.  Many logistical jobs such as 
parts management are made more complex due to spiral development.  The literature 
reviewed discussed some of the biggest logistical challenges and opportunities with SD in 
the area of integrated logistics support (ILS).   
2.1.4.1 INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT (ILS) 
There are ten elements within the DoD’s ILS framework.  They are maintenance 
planning; supply support; design interface; packaging, handling, storage and 
transportation; manpower and personnel; training and training support; technical data; 
facilities; support equipment; and computer resources support.  Although all of these 
elements are affected by using SD or EA, this review focuses on maintenance planning, 
design interface and support equipment. 
 
35 Novak R.M., Sthultz T. T., Reed T. S., and Wood C. C. (2004) “Evolutionary Acquisition: An 
Analysis of Defense Procurement and Recommendations for Expanded Use.”  Journal of Public 
Procurement.  Vol 4 (2).  p. 257. 
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Lack of maintenance planning is a common theme across the literature reviewed.  
Novak et al. state, “while the core advantage of EA is the faster fielding of technology, 
this may result in less planning for long-term supportability and maintainability of the 
asset.”36  In one of the few articles written on logistics and spiral development, Farmer, 
Fritchman, and Farkas agree, “planning can be more complex when attempting to support 
multiple increments, rather than one final delivery.”37  They go on to discuss how all of 
the planning documents and decisions take on additional complexities under SD/EA.38   
Next, while design interface seems more complex with SD, it may be more apt to 
succeed in a spiral development environment.  The design interface element essentially 
tries to capture long-term supportability issues within the up-front system design.  
Choosing components with higher reliabilities can help, as well as using a modular 
design for easier integration of future component improvements. According to some, 
design interface is “far and away the most powerful [ILS element].”39  In a traditional 
acquisition program, this element must be demanded up front, before a design gets locked 
in.  Many times this does not happen.  In SD, however, each new spiral provides another 
opportunity to influence the design to enhance long-term supportability.  Farmer et al. 
state: “Under an EA strategy, the opportunity to improve reliability on a fielded system 
happens much sooner and more often in a program as design changes with each 
increment could lower TOC, as well as improve operational performance.”40  For design 
interface to have an impact, the IPT must involve logistics personnel early and 
continuously as spirals develop. 
The third ILS element prominent in the literature reviewed is support equipment.  
Support equipment is “all the equipment required to support the operation and 
 
36 Novak R.M., Sthultz T. T., Reed T. S., and Wood C. C. (2004) “Evolutionary Acquisition: An 
Analysis of Defense Procurement and Recommendations for Expanded Use.”  Journal of Public 
Procurement.  Vol. 4 (2). p. 243. 
37 Farmer, M. E., Fritchen, G. J., & Farkas, K. J. “Supporting the Fleet in the 21st Century: 
Evolutionary Acquisition and Logistics.” Air Force Journal of Logistics, 2003. Vol. 27 (Iss. 1). p. 28. 
38 Ibid. p. 29. 
39 Farmer, M. E., Fritchen, G. J., & Farkas, K. J. “Supporting the Fleet in the 21st Century: 
Evolutionary Acquisition and Logistics.” Air Force Journal of Logistics, 2003. Vol. 27 (Iss. 1). p. 29. 
40 Ibid. p. 29. 
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maintenance of weapon systems.”41  This element is vital to the supportability of the 
system in the field.  Farmer et al. are poignant when they state, “a weapon system 
delivered to the field without support capability is little more than a static display.”42  
Due to SD’s iterative character, support equipment is needed as each spiral is delivered.  
Using existing support equipment is normally the most cost effective solution.  If each 
spiral requires different support equipment, the problems with configuration control and 
configuration management will be exacerbated.  Thus, the use of modularity and scalable 
capacity are vital for future spirals.43
In discussing the elements of ILS, the literature reviewed contained both 
challenges and opportunities for logistics in the SD/EA environment.  Conventional 
wisdom with DoD acquisitions tells us that roughly 60 to 70 percent of a system’s total 
cost occurs during system sustainment.  Since the logistics piece is the core of 
sustainment, the stakes are high indeed.   
2.2 SUMMARY 
The technology development and fielding, program management, financial 
management and logistics areas are well-established pieces of DoD’s acquisition puzzle.  
However, under SD, new opportunities and challenges arise in each of these areas.  The 
literature reviewed highlighted several areas of concern and room for potential growth.  
In addition, some of the literature highlighted varying methods to overcome challenges 
and heighten success, and emphasized areas where future investigation is needed.  It is 
with this foundation that our case study of one program embracing SD, the Air Force’s 




41 Ibid. p. 30. 
42 Farmer, M. E., Fritchen, G. J., & Farkas, K. J. “Supporting the Fleet in the 21st Century: 
Evolutionary Acquisition and Logistics.” Air Force Journal of Logistics, 2003. Vol. 27 (Iss. 1). p. 28. 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 21
III. GLOBAL HAWK PROGRAM 
This chapter provides a brief description of the interview and information 
gathering methodology.  This is followed by a short history of the Global Hawk, its 
mission and technical capabilities.  It further provides details on some of the operational 
experiences and typical flight operations.  The chapter concludes with a look at Global 
Hawk’s programmed spirals and projected strategy. 
3.1 INTERVIEW QUESTION BACKGROUND 
As discussed in the methodology section of Chapter I, the most crucial 
information in this report was obtained through interviews with key Global Hawk 
Systems Group (GHSG) personnel.  In structuring the interview questions, we wanted to 
obtain the most comprehensive and influential lessons learned from the interviewees.  To 
accomplish this, the interview questions were kept broad so the interviewee could address 
their foremost opinions on managing a spiral development program. 
The interviews were performed in an informal, threaded discussion of program 
operations guided toward the two research questions.  Interviews would normally start 
with basic information on the subject’s role in the GHSG, followed by generic research 
questions.  These questions would be tailored to the person’s subject matter.  For 
example, the logistics managers at the program office were able to give detailed 
information on current and past logistical issues in the GHSG.  They further voiced some 
of the spiral development benefits and challenges, and with some conjecture, analyzed 
how spiral development has either exacerbated problems or created opportunities that 
would not have existed otherwise.   
This threaded discussion approach allowed us to obtain the “bold faced” problems 
confronting program managers in the GHSG.  Chapter II covered documented problems 
with spiral development to date.  There were issues that we expected to hear, and did hear 
from the interviewees.  There were some surprises that had not been expressed in any 
literature.  Had it not been for the open, threaded discussions, these items might not have 
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been brought up.  We have tried to publish lessons learned from the interviews to which 
future program managers leading a spiral development effort should pay particular 
attention. 
Some of the basic information in this chapter was obtained through these 
discussions, as well as recent program office briefings and published documents.  To 
start, a brief history of the program is necessary to fully appreciate some of the problems 
faced by its managers. 
3.2 HISTORY 
Pilots in the United States Air Force undergo years of training before ever flying a 
combat mission.  The price of this training, coupled with the growing casualty aversion of 
Americans, makes the price of losing a pilot all the more detrimental.  With advancement 
in technology, there are certain missions that can be performed without putting a life in 
harm’s way.  Besides preventing loss of human life, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
have more design trade space available since they need no human centered systems on 
board such as life support systems, on-board displays, ejection seats, etc.  They can also 
be designed to go beyond the limits a human can endure such as G-force limitations for 
extreme maneuvers.  
In the 1990s, the Air Force contracted out a series of purpose-built unmanned 
reconnaissance aircraft systems including the RQ-1 Predator, RQ-2 Pioneer, RQ-3 Dark 
Star, RQ-4 Global Hawk, RQ-5 Hunter, RQ-6 Outrider, and RQ-7 Shadow.  Although 
several of these programs have since been cancelled, two are at the forefront of military 
news: the Predator and the Global Hawk.  This MBA project focuses on the Global 
Hawk. 
 Figure 1: RQ-4A Global Hawk 
 
The RQ-4A Global Hawk began in 1995 as an Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration (ACTD) built by Ryan Aerospace (who was later purchased by Northrop 
Grumman).  The ACTD was aimed at giving the warfighter a rapidly developing 
prototype intended for reconnaissance activities.  After a series of successful 
performances in joint USAF/Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) military exercises, the 
USAF decided to purchase the UAV, entering the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development phase in March of 2001.   
Soon after September 11, 2001, the Global Hawk was put into action, using the 
ACTD platforms to fly real-world missions supporting Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF).  Since the aircraft was not fully operational, their end-user, Air Combat 
Command (ACC) pilots, had not been fully trained to fly the small fleet of RQ-4A 
aircraft.  Thus, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) test pilots commanded the aircraft 
in theater during the transitional stage.   These pilots flew over 1,000 hours in the first 
year of operations, accumulating over 15,000 images in the first year alone.  
3.3  MISSION 
The Global Hawk helps provide battlefield commanders with a complete 
battlespace picture by performing virtually the same roll and mission as the aged USAF 
U-2 manned aircraft with some technology improvements.  Specifically, it provides “high 
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altitude, deep look, long endurance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
capability that complements space and other airborne collectors during peacetime, crisis, 
and war-fighting scenarios.”44   
3.4 CAPABILITIES 
The Global Hawk system is comprised of an aircraft, a ground segment, and a 
support segment.  The aircraft has a high resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) 
capable of penetrating cloud cover.  Further, it has Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) 
imagery capability.  Its High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) capability means the RQ-
4A models can loiter at 65,000 feet and travel over 12,000 nautical miles.  It can take 
detailed images of an area approximately the size of Illinois in a 24-hour period.  As a 
cog in the system-of-systems, the RQ-4A can relay information almost instantaneously to 
troop commanders at the field level via satellite.   Table 1 summarizes some of the RQ-
4A’s key characteristics and performance metrics. 
Characteristics     Performance
Weights      Altitude  65,000 ft 
 Empty  9,200 lbs  Endurance 35 hrs 
 Payload  2,000 lbs  Loiter Velocity 342 ktas 
 Takeoff Gross 26,500 lbs  Range  12,500 nm 
Length   44 ft 
Wingspan  116 ft 
Height   15 ft Source:  GHSG
Table 1: Key Characteristics of the RQ-4A Global Hawk 
The ground segment includes the Mission Control Element (MCE) located at 
Beale Air Force Base, CA, and the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE), which is 
forward deployed with the aircraft. 
The support segment includes elements such as aerospace ground equipment, tech 
orders, spares, support equipment and training.45  As with most systems, the support 
segment is vital to keep the overall system mission capable.   
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44 US Department of the Air Force (2005, Feb). Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification-
PE0305220F Global Hawk Development/Fielding. p. 202-2. 
3.5 KEY PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
ACC has identified the following four Key Performance Parameters as outlined in 
Table 2 below.  Like any program, if any of these KPP’s is not met, the program is in 
danger of cancellation. 
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KPP     
- Endurance—28 Hours 
- Airspace Coordination—Worldwide employment 
- Ground Station—Operators perform NRT mission control, monitoring and 
updates/modifications 
- Satisfy 100% of critical top-level IERs  Source:  GHSG  
Table 2: Global Hawk ORD KPPs 
3.6 OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
From an operational perspective, in addition to OEF, the prototypes have 
continued operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and its combat successes are 
impressive.  Table 3 provides a few examples of Global Hawk’s operational experiences 
in both OEF and OIF.  Unfortunately, in OIF, the Air Force has experienced a high 
failure rate, crashing two in-theater assets.  This is a relatively high percentage of losses, 
but it is a prototype aircraft.  Obviously, the risk of accidental loss of human life is 
considerably less than the risk associated with a manned aircraft.  The GHSG was able to 
take that risk into consideration when deciding to field the unproven vehicle. 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 
• GH in theater 8 March - 2 May 03 
• 16 combat missions - 357.2 combat flight hrs 
• Flew only 3% of air breathing Image Intel missions & 5% of hi-altitude 
recon sorties yet accounted for 55% of the Time Sensitive Targets (TSTs) 
generated to kill air defense equipment.            
• Over 4800 Images including: 
13 Full SAM Batteries--50 SAM Launchers--300 SAM Canisters 
70 SAM Missile Transporters--300 tanks (38% of Iraq’s Known Armor)
 Source:  GHSG
Operation Enduring Freedom 
• GH in theater 11 Nov 01 - 28 Sep 02 
• 63 combat missions 
• 1,237 combat flight hours 
• 17,338 images collected 
• 20+ program office and 30+ contractor 
  personnel deployed 






Table 3: Global Hawk's Operational Experience 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 US Department of the Air Force (2005, Feb). Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification-
PE0305220F Global Hawk Development/Fielding.  p. 202-2. 
3.7 TYPICAL GLOBAL HAWK OPERATIONS 
In a typical operation, operators at a forward operating location initiate a Global 
Hawk flight using the LRE.  Once airborne, the aircraft is handed over to the MCE 
located at Beale AFB, CA where trained ACC pilots remotely fly the UAV for the entire 
operational mission.  For landing, control of the aircraft is transferred back to the LRE 
operators at the forward operating location who launch and recover the aircraft. 
3.8 THE RQ-4B AND RESULTANT PROGRAM RESTRUCTURING  
Because of the RQ-4A’s rousing successes, the Air Force decided to build a brand 
new, larger version of the Global Hawk:  the RQ-4B.  The RQ-4B is a much larger, more 
capable version of the existing A-model necessary to carry better sensor payloads and to 
gain multi-intelligence capabilities on a single aircraft.46  Table 4 shows a comparison of 
some of the key characteristics of the RQ-4A and the RQ-4B. 
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Characteristic  RQ-4A   RQ-4B  
- Payload capacity 2,000 lbs.  3,000 lbs 
- Takeoff weight  26,750 lbs.  32,250 lbs. 
- Wingspan  116.2 ft.   130.9 ft. 
- Fuselage length  44.4 ft.   47.6 ft. 
- Endurance  31 hrs.   33 hrs. 
- Loiter at 60,000 ft. 14 hrs.   4 hrs. 
- Ave speed @ 60,000 ft. 340 knots  310 knots 
- Approximate range 10,000 n. miles  10,000 n. miles  
     Source:  GAO-05-6 Report 
Table 4: RQ-4A versus RQ-4B 
This B-model incorporates advanced technologies in several areas and requires 
both new processes and tooling for manufacturing.  To accommodate these changes, the 
Air Force has restructured the program twice since 2001.  This restructuring extends the 
development period from 7 yrs to 12 yrs and shrinks the procurement period from 20 yrs 
to 11 yrs.  This of course, translates into dramatic funding restructuring.   
                                                 
46 US General Accountability Office (2004 Nov) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global 
Hawk’s Acquisition Strategy are Needed to Reduce Program Risks: GAO-05-6.  p. 6. 
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The RDT&E funding requirements increased in total and are spread over a longer 
development timeline (12 yrs).  The procurement funding requirements were compressed 
dramatically to show huge increases in the near term to accommodate a shorter 
procurement period (11 yrs).  Figure 2 shows these differences in funding requirements 
before and after the restructuring. 
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Figure 3: Global Hawk Schedule 
The restructured program calls for a reduction in total aircraft procured from 63 to 
51.  Of the 51 aircraft being procured, 7 are RQ-4A’s and 44 will be RQ-4B’s.  In 
addition, the GHSG will produce 10 ground stations instead of the 14 originally planned.  
Figure 3 above shows the current program schedule, juxtaposing Global Hawk’s spiral 
development approach and its multiple spirals and aircraft builds against a traditional 
approach.  This shows that by the time a traditional acquisition approach would be in the 
midst of awarding a contract for production, the GHSG will have already built 15-16 
Global Hawks.   
Each spiral contains different desired capabilities.  The Global Hawk program is 
starting each new spiral on a yearly basis.  Figure 4 shows the complement of those 
capabilities by spiral. 
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Spiral 1: 
Operationalize Existing System- Worldwide operating capability 
- Sustainable support system 
 
Spiral 2: 
Expanded Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), initial Signal Intelligence (SIGINT)- 
Near horizon standoff EO/IR/SAR 
- Limited SIGINT augments IMINT mission 
 
Spiral 3: 
Full-spectrum SIGINT- Signals Intelligence to support mid-scale engagements 
- Machine level horizontal integration capable 
- Defensive threat awareness 
 
Spiral 4: 
Improved Radar- Track quality ground moving target identification 
- Airborne surveillance 
- Enhanced airspace operations and survivability 
 
Spiral 5-6: 
Full-spectrum operations- Full horizontal integration 
- Expanded communications 
- Extreme environment / Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) ops 
Source:  GHSG 
Figure 4: Global Hawk Spiral Composition 
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In addition to the Air Force procurement strategies, The US Navy is slated to 
receive two RQ-4A aircraft.  Likewise, several U.S. allies including Britain and Germany 
have expressed interest in the Global Hawk although no funding has been committed yet. 
3.9 SUMMARY  
This chapter covered Global Hawk’s history, mission, some operational 
experiences, and program strategy.  This information, along with the spiral development 
background from Chapter II, provided crucial information necessary for a discussion of 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
This chapter analyzes the benefits and challenges of using a SD approach from 
the Global Hawk program’s perspective.  Based on several interviews with GHSG 
personnel, numerous themes re-emerged when discussing the benefits and challenges of 
GHSG’s use of SD.  This report looks at those themes grouped by our four key areas of 
study:  Technology Development and Fielding, Program Management, Financial 
Management and Logistics.  Finally, this chapter concludes with a description of 
overarching lessons learned to benefit any program manager of a spiral development 
program. 
4.1  TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND FIELDING 
4.1.1  CHALLENGE: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 
Configuration management is extremely challenging for the Global Hawk 
program.  One Global Hawk manager characterized the problem as follows: 
“Configuration management problems are monstrous for us.  The answer that Global 
Hawk has chosen is to do configuration management the hard way, plane by plane, and 
ground station by ground station.”47  Currently, there are eight aircraft fielded with eight 
“vastly different configurations.”48  Good configuration management is difficult to do 
with Global Hawk’s compressed schedule and heavy personnel workload. 
As discussed in Chapter II of this report, with several spirals in a SD program, 
there is a good chance for multiple configurations.  Thus, configuration management is a 
large challenge in a program like Global Hawk, which has aircraft in development, 
production and deployment simultaneously.   
GHSG’s solution of doing configuration management “the hard way” is at odds 
with such a compressed schedule and minimal manning.  They currently have personnel 
 
47 Subject A. Telephone Interview. GHSG program management.  Aug 2005.   
48 Subject F. Telephone Interview. GHSG logistics.  Aug 2005.   
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dedicating time to building a baseline matrix tracking each aircraft’s configuration.49  
They track both the software and hardware configuration by aircraft and ground station.  
This is manageable now, with only a small number of aircraft.   
However, as the number of fielded aircraft increase rapidly over the next several 
years, this plane-by-plane management will be increasingly burdensome.  As squadrons 
of Global Hawks are put into operation, the variations of components will drive higher 
levels of spares and headaches for maintainers.   
Although there is no easy solution for this problem, program managers need to 
expect it and concentrate configuration management efforts from the start.  This could 
mean an increase in configuration management staffing and oversight, the introduction of 
automated configuration management tools, and keeping strict adherence to 
Configuration Control Board (CCB) rules. 
4.1.2  CHALLENGE: SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
Multiple software development problems, inherent to any DoD acquisition, were 
exacerbated with Global Hawk’s SD approach.  Specifically, the ground station mission 
planning software had several developmental problems that were made worse by both the 
SD approach and the concurrency that occurred between development and production.  
The program experienced large cost and schedule slips because of this issue. 50
The DoD recognizes the difficulties inherent with acquiring software.  The Air 
Force’s Guidelines for Successful Acquisition and Management of Software Intensive 
Systems states, “DoD has had a distressing history of procuring elaborate, high-tech, 
software intensive systems that do not work, cannot be relied upon, maintained, or 
modified.”51  This inherent complexity is made worse in an environment where the main 
thrust behind the program is to field capabilities quicker.  In addition, most software 
 
49 Subject G. Telephone Interview. GHSG engineering.  Aug 2005.   
50 Subject A. Telephone Interview. GHSG program management.  Aug 2005.   
51 Air Force Software Technology Support Center, (2000) Guidelines for Successful Acquisition and 
Management of Software Intensive Systems Version 3.0. p 31. 
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development efforts are under-estimated in terms of schedule and cost.  Further, once a 
software development effort is behind schedule, adding more software programmers 
actually slows the process even further due to training the new programmers on what’s 
been done.  Thus, the Global Hawk’s problem with the ground station mission planning 
software is not rare.  But it is still a problem.   
To help remedy this situation, the GH program can pursue a number of actions, 
such as:  control the requirements creep to reduce the impact on software modifications; 
use Computer Aided Software Engineering (CASE) tools to help with planning and 
estimation of resources; and rigorously monitor appropriate metrics such as “function 
points” and other “effort metrics” to measure progress accurately. 
4.1.3  CHALLENGE: SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND REQUIREMENTS 
CONTROL  
The systems engineering Vee model, shown below, is one way to depict how to 
properly consider all requirements within a program.  Moving down the left-hand side, 
requirements are decomposed and defined from the system level down to the component 
level.  Going back up the right-hand side, requirements are integrated and verified 
through testing.  All along the way, different design reviews are used as “gates” to ensure 
all system requirements are completely addressed. 
 Figure 5: Systems Engineering Vee Model52
Because GH is using a SD approach, time is very critical, perhaps even more so 
than in a traditional acquisition program.  As a result, the GHSG had originally chosen to 
save time by cutting down on the SE process.  According to one GHSG manager, to save 
schedule they did not fully utilize the SE process and did not fully decompose any new 
requirements.53    
Saving schedule is always on the radar of DoD program managers.  However, 
skipping steps in the SE process is not the answer.  Although it may save some time 




                                                 
52 Dillard, John T. (2003, Sept) “Centralized Control of Defense Acquisition Programs: A 
Comparative Review of the Framework from 1987-2003”, Acquisition Research Sponsored Report, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 
53 Subject A. Telephone Interview. GHSG program management.  Aug 2005.   
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Vee model, only after a complete decomposition can requirements be fully fleshed out 
and brought back together into subsystems for testing and ultimately synthesized as a 
completed system. 
One change the Global Hawk program recently made to combat this problem is 
adding rigorous requirements control for all new requirements.  They have established a 
bi-annual requirements working group (RWG) that marries up the user (ACC/DRH) with 
GHSG team members to discuss system requirements and their proper placement within 
any given spiral.  The collaborative approach ensures IPT commitment to the 
requirements employment strategy discussed in the literature review of this report.   
After recognizing the need to have a disciplined SE approach with regards to 
requirements, the GHSG injected more detail to the requirements process.  One manager 
at the GHSG detailed this new approach, saying, “For any new requirement that goes 
before the RWG, we require complete requirements traceability from top to bottom, full 
SE decomposition, and cost estimates.”54  This approach steers both users and planners 
away from a requirements free-for-all.  Instead, it appropriately forces everyone to 
recognize the far-reaching impacts of adding requirements, and to do a complete analysis 
before the RWG even meets.  
4.1.4  BENEFIT: CAPABILITY “FOLD-IN” 
The Global Hawk ACTD aircraft, currently on their third deployment for the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), learned about critical upgrades on the first and 
second deployments.  Because of their SD approach, they have been able to insert lessons 
learned from this operational experience into the rest of the fleet.  Because the end-state 
is not locked in with a spiral development approach, they have the flexibility to do this.  
Two specific examples are the integration of the Air Defense Situation Integrator (ADSI) 
and the Secure Instant Messaging System (SIMS).   
 
54 Subject A. Telephone Interview. GHSG program management.  Aug 2005.   
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The Global Hawk initially used preplanned routes to avoid interference with the 
U-2.  This was an undesirable fact of life since they were not able to make significant 
route deviations once airborne.  But after adding ADSI to the remaining deployed Global 
Hawk, “we have a tremendous increase in our situational awareness and we can do things 
on the fly.”55
The second capability added, SIMS, “allows the operator, Combined Air 
Operations Center, and exploiters to do real time changes to the mission to increase 
effectiveness tremendously.”56  This capability is essentially a SIPRNET-like connection 
that provides a secure, real-time chat capability between all pertinent parties to take 
advantage of narrow windows of opportunities that come about during any given mission.   
In this instance, using a spiral development approach paid dividends to the 
program office.  This is an area where spiral development can positively affect 
warfighters.  Since development (and funding) continues with every spiral, the lessons 
learned with each deployment experience can be folded in to future spirals as appropriate.  
One challenge with this capabilities fold-in is jumping the financial hurdles of last minute 
changes.  This challenge is discussed in the Financial Management section later in this 
chapter. 
Another challenge with folding in spirals is verification (testing) in a compressed 
schedule.  To reduce testing time, the program can agree to an integrated testing plan or a 
combined operational test.  An integrated test helps reduce the amount of resources 
required for testing and details areas to combine testing efforts.  Combined 
developmental and operational testing is defined as “a single, combined test program that 
produces credible qualitative and quantitative information that can be used to address 
developmental and operational issues.”57  Barnette agrees, stating “combined DT&E and 
OT&E…will assist in obtaining the goal of seamless verification by helping to eliminate 
duplicate test requirements, correcting scheduling inefficiencies, [and] identifying 
 
55 Subject A. Telephone Interview. GHSG program management.  Aug 2005.   
56 Ibid 
57  US Department of Defense (2004, Oct). Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Version 1.0. Washington, 
DC: Author. p. 9.3.3. 
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performance concerns early.”58  Additionally, early operational assessments can reduce 
the amount of overall testing needed and limit the number of surprises in major tests.     
4.2 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
4.2.1  CHALLENGE: CONCURRENCY 
There are several interpretations of what concurrency means in a DoD acquisition 
environment.  For this report, we define concurrency as simultaneous development and 
production.  According to several members of the GHSG, concurrency is a major 
management challenge to the program.  The government is agreeing to by a product 
while it is still in development.  It puts lots of risk on the government that may lead to 
severe consequences in a number of areas. 
In a traditional acquisition program, concurrency would be less prevalent, since 
events are usually performed in sequence, not in parallel.  A certain amount of 
concurrency in a program can aid in fielding a system faster.  However, too much 
concurrency can put a significant amount of risk on the program.  The GAO tells us, 
“Historically, programs with high degrees of concurrency are at greater risk of cost, 
schedule, and performance problems than programs with less overlap of development and 
production.”59   However, the SD approach encourages working in parallel.  This gives 
the opportunity for situations where the government tries to save schedule by performing 
tasks in parallel that probably should be performed in sequence. 
The November 2004 GAO report on Global Hawk’s restructuring highlighted 
Global Hawk’s use of concurrency as an extremely risky move.  The report reads, 
“Global Hawk’s highly concurrent development and production strategy is risky and runs 
counter in important ways to a knowledge-based approach and to DoD’s acquisition 
 
58 Barnette, G. L. (2005). Test and Evaluation in a Dynamic Acquisition Environment. Defense 
Acquisition Review Journal, p. 340 
59 General Accountability Office (2004, Nov). Changes in Global Hawk’s Acquisition Strategy are 
needed to Reduce Program Risk: 05-6. Washington, DC: Author. p. 10 
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guidance.”60  The restructured program and resultant compressed schedule are 
challenging at best, perilous at worst.  This concurrency approach calls for the Air Force 
to invest in 20 of the 44 RQ-4B’s before a production representative RQ-4B is fully 
flight-tested.61  In its first of three recommendations, the GAO called for the Air Force to 
re-visit its extensive use of concurrency, due to the high risk.62  
GHSG personnel readily acknowledge the existence of the concurrency risk.  One 
manager stated, “We are signing up to buy things at the same time we are developing 
them, which is inherently very risky.  We know that concurrency hazards contributed to 
the RQ-4B overruns.”63  But, the Air Force non-concurred to the GAO recommendation 
calling for more sequential development and production, stating the Global Hawk’s 
“evolutionary acquisition strategy balances acquisition risk with military need.”64  The 
Air Force maintained that the GAO’s sequential approach would delay the program by 
“several years”, and due to the resultant production break, would impose a cost impact of 
$400M. 65
One initial way the GHSG is trying to combat concurrency problems is by 
performing more pre-spiral studies to ensure that all capabilities slated for a specific 
spiral are truly ready for incorporation.66  This certainly does not solve the problem, but it 
is a good way to gain confidence in the technology levels destined for a production run in 




60 General Accountability Office (2004, Nov). Changes in Global Hawk’s Acquisition Strategy are 
needed to Reduce Program Risk: 05-6. Washington, DC: Author.  p. 1 
61 Ibid, p. 3 
62 Ibid, p 18 
63 Subject A. Telephone Interview. GHSG program management.  Aug 2005.   
64 General Accountability Office (2004, Nov). Changes in Global Hawk’s Acquisition Strategy are 
needed to Reduce Program Risk: 05-6. Washington, DC: Author., p. 31 
65 Ibid, p. 31-33 
66 Subject A. Telephone Interview. GHSG program management.  Aug 2005.   
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In total, the concurrency risk continues to loom large over the Global Hawk 
program, and will continue for the foreseeable future.  One GHSG manager called “being 
very wary of using concurrency” as one of his top two lessons learned for future spiral 
programs.67    
4.2.2  CHALLENGE: WORKLOAD 
The Global Hawk program is in development, production, testing and deployment 
all at the same time.  This means much more work in shorter periods of time versus a 
traditional program.  However, the program does not have a resultant plus up in 
personnel.  In fact, they must do more with less people.  This means managing daily work 
priorities that are very challenging and certainly dynamic.68
This problem is probably fairly common across any SD program.  In addition to 
Global Hawk’s SD approach, their high level of concurrency contributes to this 
challenge.  Further, the streamlining of the DoD’s workforce exacerbates this problem 
since there is nothing suggesting an increase in acquisition personnel in the future.  This 
requires a higher caliber workforce. 
One way to combat this challenge is to have a robust training program in place for 
all personnel.  The GHSG must establish and continually improve upon a rigorous 
training regiment for everyone, with an emphasis on cross training between functional 
areas.  For example, all GHSG financial managers should understand the requirements 
process, and the importance of configuration control.  Likewise, all engineers should 
understand the key DoD financial management tenets and constraints. 
Another must-have is a heavy reliance on IPTs with both experience and 
authority.69  If the IPT does not have both of these attributes, they will be powerless.  The 
 
67 Subject A. Telephone Interview. GHSG program management.  Aug 2005.   
68 Ibid   
69 General Accountability Office (2001, Apr). DOD Teaming Practices not Achieving Potential 
Results: 01-510.  Washington, DC: Author. P. 3. 
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GHSG should empower IPTs to make key decisions in their respective arenas with the 
full responsibility that goes with that distinction. 
 
4.2.3  BENEFIT: FLEXIBILITY 
One of GHSG’s biggest benefits from using spiral development is flexibility in 
planning.  They are able to shuffle around requirements within and between spirals based 
on changing user need and management direction.70   
Flexibility certainly comes inherently with spiral development.  But, this 
flexibility is predicated on excellent communication.  The user, contractor, and entire 
government acquisition team must be constantly aware of each other’s needs and actions.  
This can be challenging from a resource perspective, especially with a challenging 
schedule and limited resources. 
The GHSG has taken advantage of spiral development’s inherent flexibility to try 
to give the user as much capability as possible in a short timeframe.  They understand the 
importance of meeting user needs as they arise, especially with the lessons coming out of 
OEF and OIF.  This approach is good for the user, but can be tough to sustain the pace of 
change if all desired changes are left unchecked.  But, if the GHSG can keep a strong 
balance between this flexibility and solid requirements control through their RWG, they 
can sustain long-term successes for both GHSG managers and end-users.  
4.3 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
4.3.1 CHALLENGE: PPBE SYSTEM SHORTFALLS 
The dynamic technical composition of each spiral presents a financial 
management challenge.  A Global Hawk financial manager described the planning 
uncertainty this problem gives as his biggest financial challenge.  He said, “because we 
don’t know exactly what’s going in to each spiral--and if we do, it still may change--we 
 
70 Subject B. Telephone Interview. GHSG financial management.  Aug 2005.   
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have to look much closer at what type of funding we need and when.  In addition, the 
DoD’s PPBE system hamstrings us.”71  A second GHSG manager described the PPBE 
challenges as follows, “the PPBE system doesn’t fit into our scheme since it drives us to 
set dates and funding amounts, but it goes against the tenets of SD, where you don’t 
really know dates.”72
The DoD’s PPBE system is extremely complex, with its multiple types of funding 
and each type’s unique usage requirements.  A DoD financial manager must be able to 
plan for, and request the proper type of funding several years in advance to effectively 
budget for and execute a program.  In this case, a spiral’s uncertainty, which is a plus for 
adding requirements in a flexible manner, is a negative for the financial manager to 
ensure the correct type of funding is in place for each spiral.  In addition, the low fidelity 
in the required out year budgetary submissions (where one can make the most difference 
in a program’s budget), is often coupled with an underestimate of the amount of funding 
needed because technology is assumed to “be there” by then.   
In characterizing this problem, an Air Force O-5 Program Element Monitor for 
several Air Force space programs at the Pentagon, gave a good “bottom-line” example 
with real fiscal years attached to it.  In reference to the intersection of PPBES and the 
realities of managing a program, he stated, “So…if you think you need lots of additional 
funds for your program, you should estimate your requirements by Dec 05 for the funds 
you’d like to have in FY12/FY13.  The challenge, of course is that the fidelity of your 
estimates 3-9 years out isn’t that great.”73  This is a turbulent cycle from which it is hard 
to break out. 
For the Global Hawk program, this challenge could get easier as the program’s 




71 Subject B. Telephone Interview. GHSG financial management.  Aug 2005.   
72 Subject H. Telephone Interview. GHSG program management.  Aug 2005.   
73 Subject I.  E-mail interview.  Air Force PEM.  Feb 2005. 
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hold.  Granted, the PPBE system still requires out-year planning for new capabilities, and 
the pre-spiral studies may not come soon enough.  But, they can still be beneficial in this 
financial management area.   
As a hypothetical example, say the RDT&E budget for spiral X (2 years out) is at 
$20M, and a pre-spiral study shows that a new user requirement, not originally included 
in spiral X, but Y, will cost an additional $5M.  If the user really wants that requirement 
to be included in spiral X, the program will not be able to get an extra $5M within 2 years 
from the PPBE system due to its long cycle time.  But, the program will be armed with 
the knowledge from the pre-spiral study that this new requirement will cost $5M, and not 
some overly optimistic number pulled out of thin air.  They can then decide to cut out 
$5M elsewhere within spiral X to incorporate this new requirement.  If these measures 
pan out, financial managers working on Global Hawk should be able to make more 
knowledgeable decisions on the type of funding and its proper timing for future spirals. 
In addition, with time, a change in the DoD financial culture and policy might 
help remedy this problem, as more programs embrace spiral development.  As discussed 
in the literature review, Johnson and Johnson state, “the financial community and 
leadership must accept that content in later spirals is subject to change based on 
technology and user needs.  They must accept placeholders in some cases and budget for 
that.”74   This may be a long way off, but this core issue still needs to be addressed. 
4.3.2 BENEFIT: NONE GIVEN 
It is important to note that in all of our interviews with GHSG personnel, none 
gave a single financial management benefit to using SD. 
4.4 LOGISTICS 
4.4.1  CHALLENGE: SPARING ACTD ASSETS 
 
74 Johnson, W. M., & Johnson, C. O. “The Promise and Perils of Spiral Acquisition: A Practical 
Approach to Evolutionary Acquisition.” Acquisition Review Quarterly. Summer 2002. p. 186.   
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The sole remaining deployed Global Hawk aircraft is an ACTD aircraft, as were 
the other deployed assets.  Since they were ACTD assets, they were not spared anywhere 
near to the level necessary for a normal production aircraft.  In fact, according to one 
GHSG logistics manager, the first lot of aircraft was purchased without spares, making 
immediate operations impossible.  Even today, the level of spares is not adequate.  “Thus, 
we are eating up our spares.”75     
ACTDs are “designed to respond quickly to an urgent joint or Service military 
need . . . and to place a limited but demonstrated capability into the hands of the 
warfighter.”76  Since ACTDs are excellent candidates to evolve into spirally developed 
systems, this sparing problem will likely continue to occur across the DoD.  ACTD assets 
are meant to be “hobby shop-like”, with many never going beyond a demonstration 
capability.  Obviously, these assets are not spared properly for extended deployments like 
production assets are. 
Therefore, there are again two requirements at odds.  The military needs quick 
turnaround in developing ACTDs.  However, if the ACTD is fielded, the users need more 
spares.  This requires more logistics planning and funding up front, which will likely not 
be present in an ACTD budget.   
This type of problem may never have a good solution.  But, to help alleviate some 
pain, once an ACTD program is established as a spiral development production program 
candidate, a thorough logistics supportability analysis (LSA) must be accomplished 
quickly to address spares requirements.  In Global Hawk’s case, they will likely continue 
to do ad-hoc sparing for the ACTD assets.  They are addressing the proper sparing levels 




75 Subject F. Telephone Interview. GHSG logistics.  Aug 2005.   
76 Headquarters, United States Air Force, Future Concepts and Transformation Division (Nov 2003) 
Air Force Transformational Flight Plan, p. 23 
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4.4.2  CHALLENGE: SPARES REQUIREMENTS 
One GHSG manager stated, “keeping track of spares requirements with multiple 
configurations is very challenging as each spiral is very different.”77  This adversely 
affects LCC since a larger logistical footprint increases O&M funding dramatically. 
As with any spirally developed program, the Global Hawk program plans to add 
several different capabilities in each spiral.  One result of this is differing sparing 
requirements between spirals.  Each spiral could have vastly different components, thus 
multiple types of spare parts for those different components.  This could become a 
nightmare for a parts manager.  In a recent study of the US Navy’s Phalanx weapon 
system, Apte found a similar problem, noting, “The [Phalanx’s different baselines . . . 
necessitate increased logistical complexity to provide necessary spares; this complexity 
likewise causes increased lack of availability of the maintenance expertise . . . and places 
a heavy burden on inventory managers to carry the required spare parts.”78
Since spares are so critical for operational effectiveness, logisticians must study 
spares tradeoffs and encourage parts commonality between spirals.  This is a challenge 
for the Global Hawk program as it has roughly only 10 percent parts commonality 
between the A model and B model.79
A potential solution to the spares requirements for different spirals is to utilize a 
modular systems approach.  If future components “plug and play” with the current system 
architecture, the version of the component used for repair purposes would not have as 
great an impact.  For example, if the Global Hawk was truly modular, the maintainer 
could take either sensor version 1.0 or sensor 2.0 and install in the aircraft.  Both, 




77 Subject A. Telephone Interview. GHSG program management.  Aug 2005.   
78 Apte, A. (2004 Oct) “Optimizing Phalanx Weapon System Life-Cycle Support.” NPS-LM-04-014. 
Acquisition Research Sponsored Report, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. p. 5. 
79 Subject C. Telephone Interview. GHSG engineering.  Aug 2005.   
operational capability that 1.0 is not capable of performing.  However, this could float the 
program until contractors are able to produce an adequate level of spares for the new 
sensor version 
The second and potentially more adverse effect is an increase in LCC.  Since 
roughly 60 to 70 percent of a program’s total funding is spent on operations and 
maintenance, having a bigger logistical footprint due to more spares requirements hurts a 
program financially.  Financial managers must proactively discuss the long term funding 
impacts of changes between spirals to give IPT members a clear picture of the total 
funding impact.  Certainly, the best way to lower LCC is to make decisions up front, 
before the system is locked in.  Figure 6 depicts this scenario.   
 






                                                
It is always a good reminder to understand the full price tag of a proposed change 
up front, from a total resources perspective, and not be blinded by the technical capability 
increase alone.  Global Hawk is taking a great step in that direction by requiring full 
funding impacts of new requirements in their bi-annual RWG. 
4.4.3  CHALLENGE: TECHNICAL ORDERS AND TRAINING  
Another logistics challenge discussed by Global Hawk personnel is the impact of 
multiple technical orders and training on the user.  One Global Hawk manager stated, 
“for each spiral we need to spiral in both tech orders and training.  It’s hard for our users 
to keep up with the amount of changes between spirals coming at them at this pace. We 
are using electronic tech orders, which makes things somewhat better, but it’s still a huge 
challenge for us.”80
This challenge would seem likely in any spirally developed program.  In addition 
to having user involvement for the duration of the program, one way to dampen this 
challenge’s impact is to have dedicated training personnel assigned to the program.  The 
Global Hawk program has a dedicated training person in the GHSG and another 
dedicated training person at the user command (ACC/DRH) to ensure training is not 
forgotten.  They are also employing a “train the trainer” approach.  In addition to having 
dedicated training personnel on the program, the Global Hawk program should 
continually streamline and automate the training process so that training events could be 
more easily worked into users’ schedules.  Certainly, electronic tech orders are a 
wonderful start.  
This issue may call for a complete overhaul of the way training is accomplished, 




80 Subject A. Telephone Interview. GHSG program management.  Aug 2005.   
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4.4.4  CHALLENGE: INITIAL RELIABILITY/MAINTAINABILITY NEGLECT 
According to a GHSG logistics manager, Global Hawk did not have Reliability 
Centered Maintenance (RCM) or associated Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) 
initiatives at the beginning of the program.  As a result, many of the Built-In Tests (BIT), 
which would ease the maintenance burden, have not yet been put in place.  The GHSG is 
currently trying to insert these elements into spiral five.  This initiative is good, but is not 
projected for insertion until after most of the planes have been built, creating a large 
retrofit requirement.81
In the logistics community, there are several initiatives in place to try and reduce 
the logistics portion of a system’s LCC.  Some of these are RCM and CBM.  RCM 
“focuses on optimizing readiness, availability, and sustainment through effective and 
economical maintenance.”82  CBM, a subset of RCM, utilizes the latest in technology to 
monitor key operating aspects of a component.  The sensors may monitor vibration, 
temperature, or other aspects to determine if the component must be inspected or 
replaced.  CBM helps avoid much of the scheduled maintenance downtime, as the health 
of the components is being monitored continually. 
One would not expect a “hobby shop” concept technology to have a heavy 
emphasis on reliability or maintainability.  The performance of the ACTD was the 
primary selling point in the weapon system selection.  Ryan Aerospace wanted to ensure 
that their aircraft out-performed the other aircraft at the fly-off.  Therefore, they focused 
their efforts on its performance. 
The Air Force could have done several things differently to alleviate this problem.  
They could have made the maintainability and reliability a higher-level concern in 
ACTDs.  This is not highly recommended, as it will stifle the creativity driven ACTD 
efforts.  Farmer et al. state: “Under an EA strategy, the opportunity to improve reliability 
on a fielded system happens much sooner and more often in a program as design changes 
 
81 Subject F. Telephone Interview. GHSG logistics.  Aug 2005.   
82 Criscimagna, N. (2002, 3Q) Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) The Journal of the Reliability 
Analysis Center p. 5. 
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with each increment could lower TOC, as well as improve operational performance.”83  
However, the longer a program waits to make a change, the larger the retrofit problem. 
As an example, the GHSG could have made a more concerted effort to capitalize 
on this opportunity, and insert the BITs in an early spiral.  This is important, as BITs are 
found in many components of the system.  Because of this broad coverage, the impact of 
BIT on a retrofit effort is more egregious.   
To illustrate this point, if the program office decides to concentrate on the BIT for 
12 different components in spiral two, they still have to modify spiral one aircraft.  For 
GHSG, this would be approximately four aircraft to modify, or 48 BIT modifications.  If 
they wait until Spiral five, they will have approximately 20 aircraft to modify, or 240 
modifications.  Compare this to a single technology insertion, where the modification to 
aircraft ratio is one to one, and the retrofit cost is likely lower. 
4.4.5  CHALLENGE: RETROFIT EXPENSE 
According to a logistics manager at the GHSG, the program office is currently 
working to fund approximately $600 million in retrofit bills.84  This bill is approximate as 
of September 2005, and is expected to grow.  The program office did not plan for these 
costs up front, as the original intent of the program was not to retrofit follow on spirals to 
a new baseline.85
This heavy retrofit bill will likely drive the Air Force to cut out or delay some 
requirements for later spirals.  As requirements are delayed, this will increase the 
inventory of fielded aircraft that will require the retrofit, further increasing the retrofit 
bill.   
As each aircraft comes off the production line with more capability, the existing 
aircraft need to be either upgraded or spared accordingly.  In the GHSG, the original 
 
83 Farmer, M. E., Fritchen, G. J., & Farkas, K. J. “Supporting the Fleet in the 21st Century: 
Evolutionary Acquisition and Logistics.” Air Force Journal of Logistics, 2003. Vol. 27 (Iss. 1). p. 29. 
84 Subject D.  Telephone Interview. GHSG requirements planning.  Aug 2005.   
85 Subject E. Telephone Interview. GHSG logistics.  Aug 2005.   
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intent was to continue to provide spares for the multiple configurations.  Both ACC and 
GHSG agreed, after not too long, that retrofitting would lead to a lower life cycle cost for 
the Global Hawk.   
Several reasons played into this.  First, a program with multiple configurations is 
extremely hard to manage.  Second, the number of spares required is much higher than a 
system with a single configuration, driving up the cost.  Finally, as new spirals emerge 
meeting new mission critical requirements, users should not be forced to operate under 
degraded conditions with earlier spiral models. 
Hindsight being 20/20, the GHSG could have erred on the side of caution and 
expected the retrofit requirement.  Retrofit cost must be expected and planned for in any 
spiral development acquisition strategy.  Insisting on modularity of design up front could 
also help dampen the retrofit burden on a SD program. 
4.4.6 BENEFIT: NONE GIVEN 
Like the financial management section, out of every interview with GHSG 
personnel, none gave a single logistics benefit to using SD. 
4.5 LESSONS LEARNED 
Having analyzed several key challenges and benefits specific to the Global Hawk 
program’s SD approach, we derived several lessons learned that are applicable to any SD 
program.  The following section discusses each of these lessons learned, in no particular 
order.   
4.5.1 BEWARE OF HEAVY CONCURRENCY  
Global Hawk’s heavy concurrency problems were the underpinnings of the first 
of three GAO recommendations in its report GAO-05-06.  The program’s personnel 
readily acknowledge this risk, yet accept it as a fact of life.  
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All program managers of spiral development programs should be wary of a 
schedule calling for significant concurrency.  As stated earlier, GAO warns: 
“Historically, programs with high degrees of concurrency are at greater risk of cost, 
schedule, and performance problems than programs with less overlap of development and 
production.”86   
Although a compressed schedule as a result of concurrency is very attractive and 
seemingly doable on paper, it brings with it several risks that ultimately may doom the 
entire program.  All program managers thinking of embracing a concurrency-laden 
approach should have a thorough risk management plan that specifically details measures 
taken to minimize these risks. 
4.5.2 STAFF AND CROSS TRAIN 
All DoD organizations deal with manpower shortages at some point.  If a program 
is embracing a spiral development approach, managers should try to request the 
additional billets needed to meet the increased workload.  In addition, they should 
attempt to incentivize cross training within the organization’s functional areas to better 
equip the program’s staff to deal with problems from any functional area. 
4.5.3 ENSURE COMPLETE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
For a systems engineering approach to be effective, it must be allowed to fully run 
its course.  Taking shortcuts will negatively impact the program.  As Global Hawk finally 
did with their RWG, one way to help prevent shortcuts is to require all new requirements 
to be fully decomposed to show all resultant derived requirements along with the total 
costs of their implementation. 
 
 
86 General Accountability Office (2004, Nov). Changes in Global Hawk’s Acquisition Strategy are 
needed to Reduce Program Risk: 05-6. Washington, DC: Author. p. 10. 
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4.5.4 FOCUS ON SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
According to the Guidance for the Successful Acquisition and Management of 
Software Intensive Systems, “[DoD Acquisition] Programs developing large amounts of 
software ran 20 months behind schedule – three times longer than non-software intensive 
systems.”87  Because of this bleak reality, a program manager of a software intensive SD 
program should dedicate plenty of resources to software development management.  At a 
minimum, a program manager should establish a separate software IPT, monitor 
appropriate metrics, and periodically perform no-notice progress checks to include 
checking the contractor’s software documentation.  Considering DoD’s horrible software 
development track record, there seems to be little downside to heavy management 
oversight on software development. 
4.5.5 CONSIDER PRE-SPIRAL STUDIES 
With spiral development, a program continually looks to drop new capabilities 
into future spirals.  Many times, the technology readiness level (TRL) of a desired new 
capability will not be ready for inclusion in the intended spiral.  Therefore, it is critical to 
understand true TRLs and costs of new requirements in advance.  In a spiral development 
with lots of concurrency, this becomes even more important.  One way to help prevent 
premature technology transfer is to do pre-spiral studies as Global Hawk is now doing.   
Another way to ensure technology is transferred at the appropriate time is to 
utilize a tool such as the Technology Performance Risk Index (TPRI), as discussed in 
Chapter II.  The TPRI quantifies a new technology over time by integrating the degree of 
difficulty with unmet requirements, and reduces the chance of premature technology 
transfer.88  It is an excellent way to track the technical progress of key new technologies. 
 
87 Air Force Software Technology Support Center (2000), Guidelines for Successful Acquisition and 
Management of Software Intensive Systems Version 3.0. p 2.4. 
88 Mahafza S., Componation, P, & Tippett, D. “A Performance-Based Technology Assessment 
Methodology to Support DoD Acquisition.” Defense Acquisition Review Journal. Spring 2005.  p. 281. 
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4.5.6 MAINTAIN TECH ORDERS AND TRAINING   
With a heightened operations tempo in the entire DoD, warfighters are inundated 
with tasks more than ever.  Getting updated on tech orders and new training are critical to 
successful engagements using DoD weapon systems.  However, with spiral development, 
the quicker timing of recursive spirals means updates to tech orders and training come 
more often.  This can take a major toll on users.  Just when a user feels comfortable with 
the system, something changes that requires new procedures and training.   
Thus, spiral development program managers must be aware of this problem and 
plan their spirals accordingly.  As Global Hawk did, using electronic tech orders and 
having dedicated training personnel on the IPTs are two ways to help soften the impact 
on users.  In addition, managers should look to incorporate as much of the changes 
between spirals so that they are transparent to the user.  This would allow the user to reap 
the benefits of an increase in capability, yet not have to change any tactics/procedures in 
the process.   
4.5.7  UNDERSTAND ACTDS VS PRODUCTION PLATFORMS 
This may not apply to all spiral development programs, but for those that started 
as ACTD programs, understanding the differences between concept demonstrations and 
production platforms is crucial for program managers to keep at the forefront when 
making decisions.  To obtain the best war fighting capability, it is important to foster an 
environment where technological creativity is rewarded.  Once authorities make the 
decision to transition the ACTD to a full program, acquisition managers have a duty to 
analyze the current design and supportability, and make changes to ensure a reliable 
product is fielded. 
Taking an ACTD from award to fielding in minimal time comes with a price. 
Managers should make every effort to obtain realistic reliability, maintainability, and 
availability information on the system and its components.  Sparing levels must be high 
enough to support a given operational availability, or the asset is useless in time of war. 
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4.5.8 CONTROL REQUIREMENTS CREEP  
SD is designed to handle newly generated requirements from the users based on 
current operations. Folding in essential requirements in future spirals is more easily 
accomplished than in a traditional acquisition.  However, this benefit must be kept in 
check to ensure there is not a requirements potluck.   
As any DoD manager can attest, requirements creep is a costly problem.  One 
GAO report discussed the impact of a requirements change early on in the Global Hawk’s 
development, stating: 
These requirements changes increased development and procurement 
costs significantly.  For example . . . When the Air Force’s Global Hawk 
reconnaissance UAV was started in 1994, it was expected to have an 
average unit flyaway price of $10 million. Changes in the aircraft’s range 
and endurance objectives required the contractor to modify the wings and 
other structural parts, and by 1999 its cost had increased by almost 50 
percent.89   
A RAND study echoed this same concern, “[Requirements creep] occurs to a 
greater extent in UAV programs because their mission area is usually not predetermined 
and because they do not usually replace an existing system. As a result, potential system 
requirements are not constrained, which practically guarantees additions to those 
requirements laid out at the program’s inception”90 
Program managers need to work hand-in-hand with the user to flesh out 
requirements in a collaborative and methodical manner.  All parties must understand the 
impact of new requirements on the cost, schedule, and performance of the overall system.  
Pre-spiral studies and full requirements decomposition through the systems engineering 
process should help managers understand the realistic costs associated with satisfying 
each requirement.   
 
89 General Accountability Office (2004, Mar). Major Management Issues Facing DOD’s Development 
and Fielding Efforts: 04-530T. Washington, DC: Author. p.13-14. 
90 Drezner, J. A. & Leonard R. S. Innovative Development:  Global Hawk and Dark Star—Their 
Advanced Technology Demonstration Program Experience. RAND Corporation, 2002, p. 33 
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4.5.9 CONSIDER COMPONENT RELIABILITY EARLY 
Although easier said than done, this is an important aspect of fielding a reliable 
system.  Operations and sustainment of a program make up nearly 60 to 70 percent of the 
life cycle cost for most acquisitions.  Early logistics decisions in a spirally developed 
procurement will likely have a more profound impact on life cycle costs than a program 
developed using an incremental approach.  In other words, a program which ignores 
reliability concerns in the short term with a plan for improving in follow on spirals is set 
up for failure.  Programs must concentrate on improving immature system level 
reliability from the start. 
This can be accomplished through predictive estimates of component reliability, 
laboratory tests, actual demands during testing, and early feedback from initial users.  As 
true reliability will only be understood over great lengths of time, it is additionally 
important to try and maintain a high level of parts commonality from spiral to spiral.   
4.5.10 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE   
Configuration management will be more intensive in a SD program.  There are 
multiple versions to manage due to several spirals, models, retrofits, and limited upgrade 
parts availability.  Adding concurrency to this SD program puts even more stress on the 
configuration management team.  This becomes exponentially more difficult to manage 
as more weapon systems are fielded.  Logisticians and operators need to be kept abreast 
of weapon system configurations as they plan for spare and support equipment 
requirements as well as day-to-day missions.  Automated configuration management 
tools and increased staffing could help in configuration management.   
4.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed some of the benefits and challenges of using a SD approach 
from the Global Hawk program’s perspective.  It looked at these challenges and benefits 
in four key areas: Technology Development and Fielding, Program Management, 
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Financial Management and Logistics.  We then analyzed the overarching lessons learned 
to benefit any program manager of a spiral development program.  The final chapter of 




















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 59
                                                
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
STUDY 
This section summarizes the research on the use of SD in the GHSG and resultant 
recommendations and lessons learned for future SD program managers.  Although SD is 
a program management challenge, the main advantage is fielding an emerging capability 
quickly.  One GHSG manager emphasized this point by saying: 
SD gets you a large percentage of your end-state quickly.  But it doesn’t 
get you all of it.  As people start to get close to what they’re looking for, 
they get unsatisfied because they want the end-state fast.  But the approach 
isn’t to solve every problem before production.  It’s to get a useful 
capability fast, then upgrade over time.  There is a “Time Value of 
Capability” that must be reiterated to everyone.91
In today’s challenging DoD environment, program managers must perform a 
challenging juggling act of alphabet soup to keep major acquisition programs under 
control: ensure high TRLs, accurately track LCC, enforce the KPPs, utilize RCM, reduce 
TOC, and the list goes on.  While all these items may be more arduous in a SD program 
due to the compressed schedule and propensity for increased concurrency, they are all 
very useful.  However, the thrust of this report was not intended to create another time-
consuming management task.  It is a report from practitioners to practitioners on potential 
pitfalls and benefits in managing a SD program.   
5.1 CONCLUSIONS 
All of the research questions are answered in depth in Chapter IV of this report.  
The answers are summarized below. 
Research Question 1:  What are the technology development and fielding, program 
management, financial, and logistical benefits and challenges experienced by 
Global Hawk as a result of implementing a spiral development approach? 
 
 
91 Subject A. Telephone Interview. GHSG program management.  Aug 2005.   
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Technology Development and Fielding: 
Challenge:  Configuration Management – Configuration management is hard to 
do in a compressed schedule and under a heavy workload, as seen in Global Hawk.  
Multiple spirals will drive multiple fielded versions.  SD will also create versions in 
virtually every stage of the acquisition cycle, from concept to sustainment.   Currently, 
Global Hawk is managing configuration the hard way, plane-by-plane, ground station by 
ground station.  Configuration management will become exponentially more difficult as 
additional weapon systems are fielded.  Program managers can increase configuration 
management staffing and oversight, utilize automated configuration management tools, 
and ensure strict adherence to Configuration Control Board (CCB) rules to combat some 
of these problems. 
Challenge:  Software Development – The ground station mission planning 
software for the Global Hawk had several developmental problems that were worsened 
by the SD approach.  This is not an uncommon problem, and program managers can 
combat the challenge by controlling requirements creep, using CASE tools to estimate 
resources, and track appropriate software development metrics.  
Challenge:  Systems Engineering and Requirements Control – GHSG had 
initially reduced the amount of decomposition for new requirements to save on time.  
This reduced the fidelity of understanding cost and schedule impacts when planning 
future spirals.  They have since required full “requirements traceability from top to 
bottom, full SE decomposition, and cost estimates” for all requirements that are presented 
to the RWG.92  This technique avoids an impulsive requirements free-for-all that may 
occur with a SD program. 
Benefit:  Capability “Fold-In” – The GHSG has been able to fold in capabilities 
in later spirals that were not envisioned from the start, but were recognized upon fielding 
the weapon system.  These capabilities were needed based on OEF and OIF combat, and 
were folded in very quickly.  Two examples of successful “fold-in” are the ADSI and 
 
92 Subject A. Telephone Interview. GHSG program management.  Aug 2005.   
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SIMS requirements.  Because of this flexibility, ACC is able to maximize the overall 
real-time capability utilization of the Global Hawk. 
Program Management: 
Challenge:  Concurrency – High levels of concurrency put tremendous risk on 
the government, especially when the developing technology has a low technology 
readiness level (TRL).  In Global Hawk’s case, the Air Force will have purchased 20 of 
the 44 RQ-4Bs before the aircraft is fully flight-tested, a move that is “highly risky” 
according to the GAO.  Managers at the GHSG now rely on pre-spiral studies to assess 
the technology maturity prior to transfer.  Although these studies are useful, there is still 
significant concurrency risk in the Global Hawk program. 
Challenge:  Workload – SD brings with it a heavier manpower workload and 
thus changing daily job priorities within the GHSG.  Global Hawk personnel need to 
manage requirements in multiple spirals in a tightly compressed schedule.  To combat 
this, the GHSG must establish and improve upon its training program.  Additionally, it 
must ensure the IPTs have the right caliber of expertise and authority to effectively make 
decisions. 
Benefit:  Flexibility – GHSG is able to shuffle around requirements within and 
between spirals based on changing user need and management direction.  The GHSG has 
taken advantage of spiral development’s inherent flexibility to try to give the user as 
much capability as possible in a short timeframe.  But, they demand extensive 
information on all new requirements going before their RWG, to include requirements 
traceability and cost estimation to help retain requirements control. 
Financial Management: 
Challenge:  PPBES Shortfalls – GHSG is programmed in a multi-year PPBES 
cycle, managed by three-year military personnel, funded in one-year appropriations.  
These rigid timelines and rules are at odds with SD’s goal of flexibility, and unknown 
future requirements.  This drives program managers to try and estimate costs three to nine 
years out for future spirals.  This is very difficult considering the dynamic composition of 
each spiral, and the low fidelity of out year estimates.  It is hard to meet the PPBES cycle 
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timelines and still retain the flexibility necessary to inject new capabilities into a near to 
mid-term spiral.  The GHSG is now performing pre-spiral studies that should help with 
the details in realistic out year cost estimates.  A fundamental paradigm sift in DoD F.M 
is needed to truly take advantage of SD’s opportunities. 
Logistics: 
Challenge:  Sparing ACTD Assets – ACTD assets are “hobby shop” systems 
that are not normally spared properly for operational fielding, as pre-fielding LSA studies 
are only predictive.  The tendency for most programs is to overestimate reliability and 
underestimate usage.  The Global Hawk fits this mold as well.  Because of this, the 
Global Hawk will continue to provide ad-hoc sparing for the ACTD assets until 
production assets are on line.   
Challenge:  Spares Requirements – Each Global Hawk spiral is vastly different, 
making spares tracking a difficult task.  Modularity in the system architecture is one way 
to avoid this, as it would promote commonality between spirals.  This would reduce the 
number of different spares types between spirals.  Another method is to make better LCC 
decisions up front in the RWG analysis of a requirement’s impacts on the overall 
program price tag.   
Challenge:  Technical Orders and Training – It is very difficult for the Global 
Hawk end-user to keep up with the number of tech orders and training changes that come 
out with each spiral delivery.  To combat this problem, the GHSG is executing a number 
of measures.  First, they use electronic tech orders, which help ease the pain somewhat 
for the already overworked GHSG end-user.  Also, the GHSG has added both a dedicated 
training representative to its in-house team and to the user rep office (ACC/DRH).  
Finally, they are employing a “train the trainer” approach.   
Challenge: Initial Reliability/Maintainability Neglect – Many of the fault 
isolation tools were not built into the original Global Hawk.  This is expected, as it is an 
emerging concept technology.  Thus, Global Hawk is trying to incorporate BITs and 
items that ease the maintenance burden in Spiral five.  Although this will benefit the 
overall program, fault isolation capability should be added into early program spirals.   
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Challenge:  Retrofit Expense – Global Hawk had not always planned on 
retrofitting the early spirals to bring them up to the capability of the latest spiral.  
However, the IPT decided that the increased capability on all the assets was worth the 
price.  Despite a $500-$600 Million bill, they have changed course and are making efforts 
to upgrade early spirals to operate with the most current version.  This is a tall order, and 
is another reason to call for modularity in the architectural design.   
Research Question 2:  What are some of the lessons learned from the Global Hawk 
program’s spiral development approach that could be useful to other program 
managers directing a spiral development program? 
 1.  Be aware of the impacts of concurrency in SD 
 2.  Due to SD’s heavy workload and shortened timeframe, staff accordingly and 
cross train. 
 3.  The systems engineering process must be given time to fully decompose 
requirements. 
 4.  A SD program manager cannot have too much oversight on software 
development. 
 
 5.  A SD program should do pre-spiral studies to ensure planned capability “drops” 
in future spirals are executable and smart. 
 6.  Technical orders and training problems are exacerbated with SD. 
 7.  Don’t forget that an ACTD program is a concept, not a production platform. 
 8.  Rigorous requirements control is vital to SD success. 
 9.  Make concerted effort to build robustness into component reliability in early 
spirals 
 10.  High levels of concurrency make configuration management a tall order. 
 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The first recommendation for further study is to examine the impacts of SD on 
TOC.  Although it is too early to gain a full understanding of TOC implications, the 
notion of rapid fielding, concurrent design and production, and increased risk will almost 
certainly raise procurement costs.  In addition, once several programs have fielded 
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weapon systems using spiral development, further research is required on operation and 
sustainment costs of these weapon systems.  We believe that SD will field more 
configurations of the end-item system than a traditional acquisition program would.  
Thus, each configuration will need its own support equipment, and have very large 
logistical footprints.  This will probably increase LCC of a SD system   
The second and final recommendation for study is to analyze the key MTBF data 
(actuals) for the Global Hawk ACTD platforms as seen in OEF and OIF.  That data and 
analysis can be used to refine the Global Hawk’s supportability plan. Since the Global 
Hawk is an ACTD platform, built with a hobby-shop mindset, one would expect lower 
reliability than a production asset.  Given that the aircraft has logged thousands of hours 
in OEF and OIF combat missions, what do the actual MTBF show?  How can those data 
be used to adjust the Global Hawk’s long-term supportability plans?   
5.3 SUMMARY 
This MBA project identified key characteristics necessary to implement spiral 
development in government acquisitions, and presented lessons learned through a case 
study of the Global Hawk UAV Program.  This paper examined the Global Hawk’s spiral 
development strategies in several key program functional areas.  It discussed SD 
challenges, and benefits with particular attention given to successful tactics and potential 
pitfalls of using this acquisition approach.  Finally, it derived several lessons learned 
applicable to any DoD program manager.   
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